Neutralization of High-Value Individuals (HVIs) – From 2016 to 2025, sustained security operations led to the neutralization of 28 HVIs through armed encounters and security operations, of which, 10 were amirs or leaders:
1) Mohammad Jaafar Maguid (@Tokboy) was killed on 05 January 2017; he was a leader (Amir) of the Maguid Group;
2) Abdullah Romato Maute (@Amer / Abu Hassan) was killed in August 2017; he was a leader (Amir) of the Maute Group;
3) Isnilon Hapilon (@Musab / Tuan) was killed on 15 October 2017; he was a leader (Amir) of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG);
4) Owaida Marohombsar (@Abu Dar) was killed on 17 March 2019; he was a leader (Amir) of the Maute Group;
5) Salahuddin Hassan was killed on 29 October 2021; he was a leader of the Hassan Group;
6) Esmael Abdulmalik (@Abu Turaifie) surrendered on 06 August 2023; he was a leader of the Turaifie Group;
7) Fahrudin Hadji Satar (@Jer Mimbantas / Zacharia / Omar / Abu Bakar) was killed on 14 June 2023; he was a leader of the DI–Maute Group;
8) Muhiddin Animbang (@Karjalan) was killed on 22 April 2024; he was a leader of the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF);
9) Khadafi Mimbesa (@Engineer) was killed on 25 January 2024; he was a leader of the DI–Maute Group;
10) Mohammad Usman Solaiman was killed during an encounter on 07 December 2025; he was a leader of the DI–Hassan Group.
*Leadership Disruption and Organizational Decline* - Focused government operations have resulted in the neutralization, arrest, or surrender of key terrorist leaders, creating a leadership vacuum within remaining LTGs. The loss of senior figures has weakened command structures and reduced the ability of these groups to plan, direct, and sustain operations.
*Downtrend in LTG Strength and Capability* - Available indicators show a steady decline in LTG manpower, firearms, territorial influence, and violent incidents since 2016. Remaining groups are fragmented and largely defensive, with diminished operational reach and limited ability to regroup.
*Strong PCVE Programs and Community Involvement* - Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) programs continue to encourage peaceful surrender, reintegration, and community participation. Localized peace initiatives, livelihood support, and cooperation with local leaders have reduced vulnerability to extremist recruitment and strengthened grassroots resilience.
*No Training Capability or Large-Scale Attacks* - There have been no recorded terrorist training activities, recruitment efforts, or large-scale attacks by domestic LTGs since 2016. This underscores the erosion of their operational capacity and the effectiveness of sustained security monitoring.
*Improved Security Situation in BARMM* - The security environment in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) has markedly improved. Basilan is now free of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) presence, while Jolo, Sulu, and other areas are experiencing renewed economic activity and tourism, reflecting increased public confidence and normalized daily life.
*Overall Assessment:*
Terrorism threat levels in several areas of Western and Central Mindanao have shifted from high to low. While global extremist networks continue to exploit cyberspace, there is no indication of imminent domestic terrorist threats at this time. Government forces remain vigilant and committed to sustaining peace, security, and development nationwide.
At the global level, the AFP remains engaged in information-sharing and regular coordination with government and international partners to support early awareness and timely responses. In certain regions such as South Asia, the Sahel, and Central Africa, Islamic State-linked elements continue to exploit local conditions and grievances to attract followers, underscoring the need for sustained international collaboration.